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Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the appellant, hereby submits the following brief. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is appropriate in this Court 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
the Utah Constitution. Jurisdiction is further appropriate 
because this matter involves issues of a Constitutional nature 
which is ripe for decision by this Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
1. Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1992) is unconstitutional 
in that it violates the Defendants right to seek redress through 
the Court system and gives Plaintiffs an unfair advantage by 
allowing them the ability to collect monetary damagesf under an 
unconstitutional ordinance, simply because they may pick the 
forum in which to proceed. 
2. Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 are 
unconstitutional in that establish a rule of evidence binding 
upon the Court and the City has no real or express power to enact 
such ordinances and the Court erred in ruling that Leahy was 
liable pursuant these ordinances. 
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3. An ordinance which creates liability on the basis of 
ownership of a car does not provide adequate due process, notice 
of wrongdoing sufficient to inform the person to be held liable, 
and opportunity to defend or correct and is therefore 
constitutionally defective. 
Standard of Review 
Issues 1, 2 and 3, are legal issues asking the Court to 
determine the correctness of the lower Court's legal 
determination and this Court must therefore review these issues 
under the "correction of error" standard, giving no deference to 
the Lower Court's conclusions of law. (State v. Steward, 806 
P.2d 213, (Utah App. 1991); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, (Utah 
App. 1991). 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
4. There was insufficient evidence to find Leahy liable 
under 12.56.130. 
5. The City of Salt Lake brought action to enforce an 
"implied contract" and the Court erred in determining that Leahy 
was liable, without evidence that he was the person who entered 
into that contract. 
6. The was insufficient evidence of damage to support a 
finding of damage to Salt Lake City, in the amount of $7.00. 
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Standard of Review 
Issues 4, 5 and 6 are issues relative to evidence before the 
lower Court and the interpretation placed upon them and therefore 
require this Court to apply the "clearly erroneous" Standard of 
Review and give "due regard" to the trial Court's ruling. 
Defendant is required to and will "marshall the evidence most 
favorable to the lower Court's ruling." (State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 
467, (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
"No person shall be deprived of live, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 
"All courts shall be open, and every person 
...shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shall be barred from ... defending before 
any tribunal, any civil cause to which he is a party." 
Utah Constitution. Article I, Section 11 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
".... (2) The appeal to the circuit court is a trial de 
novo and shall be tried in accordance with the 
procedures of the small claims department, except a 
record of the trial shall be maintained. The decision 
of the trial de nov may not be appealed unless the 
court holds a statute or local ordinance 
unconstitutional." 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 1992) 
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" . . .. The judgment of the small claims department ... 
is conclusive upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim 
has been interposed. If the defendant is dissatisfied, 
he may,... appeal..." 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1986) 
ORDINANCES 
"...B. No person shall park any vehicle in any parking 
meter space, ... without immediate depositing in the 
parking meter contiguous tot the space such lawful coin 
or coins of the United States as are required for such 
meter and designated by directions on the meter 
C. No person, ... shall permit any vehicle parked 
by such person to remain parked in any parking meter 
space during any time when the parking meter contiguous 
to such space indicates that no portion remains of the 
period of which the last previous coin or coins has 
been deposited, or beyond the time limited for parking 
as designated on the meter." 
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 12.56.150 
"Whenever any vehicle shall have been parked in 
violation of any of the provisions of any ordinance 
prohibiting or restricting parking, the person in whose 
name such vehicle is registered shall be prima facie 
responsible for such violation and subject to the 
penalty therefor." 
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 12.56.530 
"Whenever any vehicle shall have been employed in the 
unauthorized use of streets, the person in whose name 
such vehicle is registered shall be strictly liable for 
such unauthorized use and the penalty therefor." 
Salt Lake City Ordinance, 12.56.56 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a civil judgment wherein Leahy was 
found liable to Salt Lake City in the amount of $33.00. Leahy is 
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contesting the constitutionality of city ordinance under which he 
was found liable. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The case was originally tried in the Small Claims Division 
of the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake City Department on February 
26, 1992, finding Appellant (hereinafter "Leahy") liable to the 
Defendant in the amount of $118.00 and was appealed to the Third 
Circuit Court, due to the unconstitutionality of the ordinance 
under which liability was established. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Circuit Court found Leahy liable to the Plaintiff 
(hereinafter "Salt Lake City") in the amount of $33.00. Leahy 
appeals again, challenging the constitutionality of the 
ordinance, under which he was found liable. 
FACTS 
1. On or about October 27, 1990, a car was parked in a 
metered location. That car was registered to Leahy, and at some 
point the meter expired and was ticketed. 
2. Salt Lake City filed a Small Claims Affidavit and Order 
on March 11, 1991 and was served upon Leahy on January 11, 1992. 
Trial was scheduled for February 26, 1992. This affidavit 
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specifically stated that Leahy had violated Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 12.56.130 and claimed Leahy's liability was imposed 
pursuant to Salt Lake city Ordinance 12.56.530, as the registered 
owner of the vehicle. 
3. Leahy appeared in Small Claims Court and contested the 
constitutionality of Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.130 and 
12.56.530 which were the basis of the Affidavit and Order. 
Judgment for Salt Lake City was entered in the amount of $118.00. 
4. Leahy appealed the judgment and a Trial de novo was held 
in the Circuit Court, Leahy again contested the constitutionality 
of the Ordinances and the sufficiency of the evidence against 
him. Salt Lake argued that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.560 
additionally created liability on Leahy's part. 
5. Judgment was entered against Leahy in the amount of 
$33.00, Circuit Court Judge McCleve stating that she believed 
that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 imposed a 
liability on Leahy and that such ordinances, which applied only a 
civil penalty, were constitutionally valid. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Evidence of ownership of a vehicle is not sufficient 
evidence of liability under what is in actuality a lawsuit to 
enforce an implied contract. Salt Lake City (hereinafter "the 
City") suffered damage only in the amount it was deprived, 
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through failure to deposit coins for whatever period of time the 
vehicle was parked there. The City has no power to enact 
ordinances which create a liability based solely on ownership of 
the vehicle and such an ordinance, besides being outside of the 
City's constitutional and statutory powers, also violates the 
constitutional requirements of due process. 
The City has chosen the forum in which it wished to proceed 
in this matter. Leahy does not have the same choice. If it is 
true that the ordinances complained of are unconstitutional, the 
City gets the benefit of enforcing these same ordinances without, 
the Defendants named in such suits, having adequate redress. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1992) is unconstitutional 
in that it violates the Defendants right to seek 
redress through the Court system and gives Plaintiffs 
an unfair advantage by allowing them the ability to 
collect monetary damagesf under an unconstitutional 
ordinance, simply because they may pick the forum in 
which to proceed. 
The present amendment of this Utah Code has not been tested 
in the Courts. However, the previous version Utah Code 
Annotated, 78-6-10 (1986) which prevented the Plaintiff, in a 
Small Claims action, from appealing unless a Counterclaim was 
interjected, was tested for constitutionality. 
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In the case of Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 
1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that this limitation was not 
unconstitutional because: 
"..•Plaintiff has the choice of filing his 
complaint in the small claims court, the circuit court, 
or the district courtf all of which would have 
concurrent jurisdiction in this matter..." 
The same logic applies in this matterf since the current 
statute prevents an appeal from a trial de novo "unless a statute 
or ordinance is found to be unconstitutional." 
It is difficult to imagine a case in which a challenge to 
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance would be 
asserted, in a small claims matter, except as a defense to a 
claim. Therefore, if a statute or ordinance were to be found 
unconstitutional, it would it be to the benefit of the defendant 
and he would not be likely to appeal. However, it would be to 
the detriment of the Plaintiff and he would be more likely to 
appeal causing the Defendant additional expense. 
Conversely, should the state or ordinance be, in fact 
unconstitutional, the Plaintiff has the added benefit of being 
able to collect an unjust award, simply because he choose to 
begin in Small Claims Court. The Defendant, in such 
circumstances might wish to originally defend in the Circuit 
Court, from which he can seek a constitutional review by the 
Court of Appeals, but he has no choice in the matter and redress 
becomes impossible• 
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This limitation of the Defendant's right to seek redress 
clearly violates the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11. 
In criminal matters, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have held that the limitation placed on appeals from trials de 
novo from justice courts, pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal 
Proceduref Rule 26(13)(a) is constitutional. That Rule declares 
that the "decision of the circuit court is final except when the 
validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance is 
raised in the justice court." (Monticello v. Christensen, 788 
P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), 769 P.2d 853 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). The 
issue in these matters becomes whether or not the Defendant had 
raised the constitutionality or validity of the statute or 
ordinance. The same application is required in civil matters in 
order to protect the Defendant's rights to due process. 
In this case, the Defendant did challenge the 
constitutionality of the ordinances imposing liability on him, in 
both the lower courts. (See Transcript, pages 22-24). The Court 
found the ordinances constitutional (See Transcript, pages 25-
26), and found Leahy liable, based upon those ordinances. 
Now, by virtue of Utah Code Annotated, 78-6-10 (1992), Leahy 
may be required to pay a judgment entered under an ordinance 
which is unconstitutional. The City obviously picked it's forum 
wisely, in order to continue to collect fees under an ordinance 
which cannot be challenged in the only Court which can declare it 
invalid. It recognizes that only the appellate Courts can strike 
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it down (See Transcript, page 24), and has the benefit of a 
statute which prohibits that very review. 
Therefore, this Court should declare Utah Code Annotated, 
78-6-10 to be unconstitutional and review the constitutionality 
of Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560. 
Salt Lake City Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 are 
unconstitutional in that establish a rule of evidence 
binding upon the Court and the City has no real or 
express power to enact such ordinances and the Court 
erred in ruling that Leahy was liable pursuant these 
ordinances• 
The leading case on the subject of the powers of cities to 
pass ordinances is Nasfell v. Oqden, 249 P.2d 507 (Utah 1952). 
In that case, the Defendant, in a criminal case for violation of 
Ogden's parking ordinances, sought a declaratory judgment 
"declaring the presence of a vehicle, parked in violation of any 
ordinance, on amy public street in the city, prima facie evidence 
that the registered owner of such vehicle committed or authorized 
such violation" (emphasis added) was invalid. The Court did not 
distinguish between criminal and civil matters, but stated: 
".... Cities in Utah derive their powers through 
express legislative grant... 
Ogden assumes that because cites have been given 
the power to regulate streets and the parking of 
vehicles for a fee, together with the powers to enforce 
such powers, they necessarily have the implied power to 
pass an ordinance establishing a rule of evidence 
binding on the courts...Power to pass an ordinance 
establishing a rule of evidence binding on the courts 
is not granted to cities in express words, nor can it 
be fairly implied from, nor is it incident to, the 
powers expressly given..." 
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This case has become the accepted law on the subject. The 
only exception the Supreme Court has recognized is that 
ordinances can be passed to help enforce ordinances relating to 
the health, safety, morals and welfare of it's citizens, under 
the police powers granted to the cities by the legislature. 
(State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980) 
It can not be argued that collecting money on parking 
tickets effects the health safety, morals or welfare of it's 
citizens either directly or indirectly. 
An ordinance which creates liability on the basis of 
ownership of a car does not provide adequate due 
process, notice of wrongdoing sufficient to inform the 
person to be held liable, and opportunity to defend or 
correct and is therefore constitutionally defective. 
It is well settled law that due process demands that one 
have notice and opportunity to defend. For a statute to declare 
that the owner of the vehicle is automatically liable for the 
contractual duties the driver has entered into, without having to 
prove that the owner was the person who entered the contract, 
clearly denies him notice of the contract and opportunity to 
defend his position. Salt Lake City Ordinaces 12.56.530 and 
12.56.560 are clearly in violation of the Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Section 7. 
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There was insufficient evidence to find Leahy liable 
under 12.56.130. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.56.130 clearly states that "no 
person" shall park a vehicle in violation of the parking 
ordinances or "allow" that vehicle to remain after the meter has 
expired. The evidence presented at trial did not include a 
description or an identification of Defendant as the person who 
parked the car or allowed it to remain there past the time 
allowed on the meter. (See transcript, pages 9-10). The City 
relied upon the liability established in Salt Lake City 
Ordinances 12.56.530 and 12.56.560 in order to establish their 
case against Leahy. 
The City of Salt Lake brought action to enforce an 
"implied contract" and the Court erred in determining 
that Leahy was liable, without evidence that he was the 
person who entered into that contract. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, 323 defines an implied 
contract as: 
"... one inferred from conduct of parties and arises 
where plaintiff, without being requested to do so, 
renders services under circumstances indicating that he 
expects to be paid therefor, and defendant, knowing 
such circumstances, avails himself of the benefit of 
those services. Chem-Tronix Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Solocast Co., A.D., 5 Conn.Cir 533, 258 A.2d 110, 113. 
It is an agreement which legitimately can be inferred 
from intention of parties as evidenced by circumstance 
and ordinary course of dealing and common understanding 
of men. Martin v. Little, Brown, & Co., 304 Pa.Super. 
424, 450 A.2d 984, 987." 
It is commonly understood that one who parks by a meter is 
to deposit coins. Thus the City provides convenient parking 
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spaces for a fee, and one who parks in those spaces is expected 
to deposit the fee. Therefore, whosoever parks at a metered 
parking space, enters into an implied contract with the City. 
The question becomes, who entered into the space and the 
agreement? The vehicle could not have entered into the 
agreement, it is an inanimate object. The person who parked in 
the space would be the party who contracted for services. If the 
vehicle was parked by someone other than the Defendant, it would 
be that person who entered the contract. The City must then 
demonstrate that the Leahy knowingly entered into the contract. 
They have not done so. 
The was insufficient evidence of damage to support a 
finding of damage to Salt Lake City, in the amount of 
$7.00. 
The City's charge for parking in their parking space is 25 
cents per half hour, or 50 cents per hour. There is no argument 
that the meter was expired. The question of damage then must be 
established by proving how long the vehicle was parked without 
depositing coins and that further, the City could have reasonably 
expected to rent that space to someone who would have paid the 
appropriate fee. They might, alternatively, prove that it costs 
them x amount of dollars to put overtime notices on the car. The 
City did not produce any such evidence, and relied solely upon 
the statement that the "[if] paid within seven days, fine was 
$7.00" without showing any damage. (See transcript, page 7.) 
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EVIDENCE MARSHALLED 
The evidence before the Court was: 
1. A vehicle registered to Leahy was parked in a metered 
space past the time for which coins had been deposited. 
2. The operator of the car was unknown. 
3. Salt Lake City Ordinances imposed liability on the owner 
of the vehicle. 
4. The "fine" for violation of parking ordinances (imposed 
by Salt Lake City) is $7.00. 
5. Letters had been sent to Leahy, telling him of the 
parking violation. 
No other evidence was presented to the Court. This evidence 
is clearly insufficient pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.56.130. It does not establish any standard of damage nor does 
it prove liability on Leahy's part. 
CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake City is being wrongfully enriched by virtue of an 
uncostitutional statute, and is being aided by the limitation on 
the right to appeal from the Small Claims Court. Salt Lake City 
choses the forum to pursue its claimsf establishes the standard 
to prove liability and arbitrarily sets the damage amount without 
having to prove anything other than the ownership of the car. 
Non governmental plaintiff's in civil matters are not given the 
same advantages, nor should Salt Lake City. 
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WHEREFORE, Leahy moves the Court to reverse the judgment 
granted against him in the Small Claims Court by virtue of the 
unconstitutionality of the ordinances under which he was found 
liable. 
DATED this /% day of September 1992 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ronald Scott Leahy 
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